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INFLATION, POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND STOCKMARKET
VOLATILITY IN INTERWAR GERMANY
Hans-Joachim Voth*
What determined the volatility of asset prices in Germany between the wars?
This paper argues that the influence of political factors has been overstated.
The majority of events increasing political uncertainty had little or no effect
on the value of German assets and the volatility of returns on them. Instead,
it was inflation (and the fear of it) that is largely responsible for most of the
variability in asset returns.
Few periods in history show a closer connection between political events and
economic change than the Weimar Republic. The extent to which the collapse
of democracy was a result of misguided economic policies (and a structurally
weakened economy in general) produced heated debate. That the politically
induced uncertainty and the inflation during the early years of the Republic
were economically harmful has also been contended, even if some scholars
continue to argue that the inflation had many benign effects.  Holtfrerich
(1991) argues that inflation was not only necessary to integrate returning
soldiers into the economy, but that Germany may have saved the world
economy from a major recession in the early 1920s. Since it was relatively
economically buoyant at the same time when the UK and the US experienced
post-war recessions, its high demand for imports from these countries helped
to avert a complete collapse. An older literature had also assumed that high
inflation had facilitated investment. Industry-level studies, such as the one of
the machine-tool industry by Lindenlaub, have failed to provide much evidence
in favour of this. The benign effects of inflation have been challenged by
Ferguson (1995, 1996), who argues that neither political nor economic benefits
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were sufficient to compensate for the havoc wrought, and that policy
alternatives were readily available.
Stock Market Volatility
Stock prices have two characteristics that distinguish them from the prices of
most other assets. First, data on the US stock market shows returns that are
markedly higher than can be explained by most models of economic behaviour.
Because stocks showed average returns of 7.0 percentage points per year over
the period 1921-96, most authors conclude that simple investors are 'leaving
big bills sitting on the sidewalk.' This is true even after taking into account the
second striking characteristic of stock prices – their high volatility. Price
movements are often too sharp to be accounted for by changes in underlying
profitability or the risk-free rate, suggesting that 'animal spirits' play a large
part in the setting of share prices. Shiller (1981) showed that movements in
dividends are markedly less sharp than those in share prices, and that – since
shares simply represent an entitlement to future dividend payments – the
largest component responsible for changes in prices must be the way future
cash flows are discounted. This will depend on the risk-free rate used as well
as the probability of the firm in question continuing to make payments.
Schwert (1989) examined what how strongly the volatility of macroeconomic
variables was correlated with stock market volatility. He finds that most
variability cannot be explained, but that a number of variables exhibit some
correlations. Output volatility, interest rate and bond volatility show positive
correlations. Stock prices are more likely to fluctuate sharply if leverage in the
corporate sector is high, or if the economy is in recession. Nonetheless,
especially during the Great Depression, most of the volatility cannot be
accounted for. Schwert suggests that this may be to do with uncertainty about
the survival of the capitalist system in the US – a non-zero probability,
changing from period to the next, that the country might "go communist". Such
a possibility is known to economists as the "peso problem" – asset prices being3
influences by fluctuations in the perceived likeliness of a large future event
occurring.
Bittlingmayer (1998) extended this approach to Germany in the interwar
period. The likely impact of "peso-style" problems had already been noted by
Becht and DeLong (1992), who excluded the interwar years from their study of
volatility in Germany. Bittlingmayer uses monthly data on the German share
index to show that volatility was particularly high during the periods when
political events "clustered", especially during the first years of the Weimar
Republic. In particular, he argues that the armistice and the revolution,
combined with the putsches, strikes and insurrections of the early 1920s,
combined with the Ruhr invasion, were directly responsible for the very high
level of stock price volatility. He also finds that stock market volatility had a
strongly negative effect on industrial production.1 Uncertainty and volatility in
general are often thought to have negative effects because of the irreversible
nature of investments (Pindyck 1991, Bernanke 1983). The value of waiting
tends to increase with the level of uncertainty and the degree to which
investments, once made, become irreversible. Bittlingmayer remains agnostic
as to the exact causal relationships – instead of arguing that stock price
volatility caused output declines, he suggests that political events determined
the course of both output and stock prices.
Stock Returns during the Weimar Republic
Stock returns in general are known to exhibit a number of special
characteristics. First, compared to the normal distribution, there appear to be
"too many" large and small price movements, i.e. the return distribution often
has "fat tails". Second, the number of price movements around the mean of the
distribution is larger than in the case of the normal distribution. A
comprehensive measure of these characteristics is sample kurtosis:2
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where T is the number of observations, s is the variance, m is the mean, and xt
is the return at time t. Also, stock returns often exhibit (weak) skewness – i.e.
a tendency to be more often above than below the sample mean in the case of
positive skewness. Sample skewness is defined as
3
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In the case of the normal distribution, skewness is equal to zero and kurtosis is
equal to three.
Typical values found in empirical studies of the stock market show skewness
between –0.29 and 0.07, and excess kurtosis (i.e. K-3) equal to 2.4 to 4.1.3
Typical volatility ranges from a standard deviation of 4.3 to 5.8.
Table 1 compares stockmarket returns in interwar Germany with results from
the US and German data on the period before WWI and after WWII. We use
the index of real share prices constructed by Gielen.4 It is the first series that
takes full account of the value of dividend payments, thus giving a full
impression of the total return that shareholders could have realized if they had
reinvested all dividends. It is thus in line with other "performance" indices
such as the DAX, and provides a better basis for judging the overall change in
value than pure price indices (such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average).
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period mean st.dev. skewness excess
kurtosis
minimum maximum
US Value 1962-94 0.96 4.33 -0.29 2.42 -21.81 16.51
Equal 1962-94 1.25 5.8 0.07 4.14 -26.8 33.17
Germany Value 1870-1913 0.4 3 -0.28 2.4 -14.9 11.7
Value 1919-1933 0.16 14.7 0.08 7.3 -52.08 61.1
Value 1949-92 0.8 4.4 -0.21 2.91 -26.2 15.1
Stockmarket returns in interwar Germany were unusually low – an average
return of 0.16 percent per month over the period. Excess kurtosis is present in
all series, but Weimar Germany exhibits it in the extreme – 7.3 instead of a
maximum of 4.14 on the equally-weighted US index in the postwar period.
Also, the range of observed price movements is notably larger. While no other
index fell by more than 26.8 percent or rose by more than 33.2 percent (US
equally-weighted index), the sharpest fall in Germany in a single month wiped
more than half of the value off equities. Also, the most rapid increase brought
a rise of more than 61 percent. Using the standard deviation of stock returns
as a measure of overall variability, it emerges that Weimar's stockmarket was
more than three times as volatile as the average of other markets (and
periods).
The contrast with pre-war Germany is particularly striking (figures 1 and 2).
Other authors have noted the unusual stability of German share prices before
WWI.5 Not only did prices fluctuate about 80% less (the standard deviation of
stock returns is merely one fifth of that seen in Germany 1919-33), but the
maximum and minimum change in prices were also much smaller. Becht and
DeLong noted that, in contrast to the American stock market, the German one
did not exhibit "excess volatility", i.e. that the variability of price changes
relative to the variability of dividends was not too high.
                                                 











Mean      0.001595
Median   0.003250
Maximum   0.610900
Minimum  -0.520800
Std. Dev.    0.146773
Skewness    0.080226
Kurtosis    7.330405
Jarque-Bera  140.8361
Probability  0.000000











Mean      0.004643
Median   0.004746
Maximum   0.117121
Minimum  -0.149558
Std. Dev.    0.030278
Skewness   -0.282056
Kurtosis    5.428291
Jarque-Bera  136.4671
Probability  0.000000
Figure 2: Return distribution, German stock market, 1870-1913
To what extent did volatility change with political events? Bittlingmayer
(1998) presents a graph showing rolling estimates of the standard deviation of
stock returns. Vertical lines indicate the timing of major political events such
as the Armistice, the Occupation of the Ruhr, or the London Conference. While
it is possible to identify a large number of events that can be expected to have
an impact, there is no clear ex ante criterion that would suggest that only
these events should be included – wouldn't an observer with no additional
knowledge of the Weimar economy assume that the turmoil of the early 1930s,
with the electoral successes of the Nazi and Communist party, rule by decree,
constant budget crises, the so-called "Preussenschlag" (that deposed the
legitimate government of the largest state) and the final ceding of power to7
Hitler, should have had at least a similar impact, if political events were
indeed so important in triggering "peso-problems"? The data suggest that the
Great Depression saw markedly lower variability than the early years of the
Republic – the standard deviation of stock returns was a mere 6%, less than
one third than the 22% observed between 1919 and 1924.
Political Events and the Timing of Price Changes
When did the largest changes in the performance index of German stocks occur
during the interwar period? If the Bittlingmayer hypothesis is correct, we
should expect that a number of events such as the London Ultimatum, the
French invasion of the Ruhr, the assassination of Erzberger, the publication of
the Peace Treaty terms, the Hitler putsch, the communist uprising in the Ruhr
and the turmoil in Saxony and Thuringia caused sharp falls on the German
exchanges. Events such as the stabilization of the Mark, on the other hand,
should have had a favourable impact. We begin by examining the ten largest
positive and the ten largest negative price movements of the German stock
market between 1919 and 1933.
The largest price decline came in August 1923, when the so-called
"government of the economy" fell and was replaced by the Stresemann
government. Bad as the general situation of the economy was, with inflation
increasingly spiralling out of control, neither August 1923, December 1923, nor
September 1922 can seriously be called the high points of political uncertainty
in interwar Germany – yet they registered the three largest price declines of
52, 50, and 45 percent respectively. September 1922 registered almost
exclusively good news, with successful agreements with Belgium on
reparations being negotiated and the Reparations commission filing a positive
report on the chances for a moratorium. The Hitler Putsch in Munich,
definitely one of the periods of greatest uncertainty, however, did see the
fourth-largest price fall. Interestingly, the stock market crash of 1927 –
instigated by the Reichsbank leaning on the banks to curtail lending to the8
stock market – does not make the top ten largest monthly declines (being in
58th place on the total list of price declines).
Even more oddly, some of the largest price increases occurred when the Reich
was in crisis. In September 1923, with the crisis between Bavaria and the
Reich at a high point and a state of emergency having been declared
throughout the Reich, the share price index rallied by more than 50 percent.
The third-largest increase in share values occurred in January 1923, when
France invaded the Ruhr to ensure reparations payments and Litauen invaded
Memelland.
TABLE 2
TEN LARGEST PRICE MOVEMENTS, 1919-1933
greatest price increases greatest price declines
rank month price change events month price
change
events
1 1923M06 0.6109 1923M08 -0.5208 Cuno government replaced by
Streseman
2 1923M09 0.5119 Crisis in Bavaria, state of
emergency in the whole Reich
1923M12 -0.5007
3 1923M01 0.4335 France invades the Ruhr
Litauen invades Memelland
1922M09 -0.4507 Positive report from
Reparations commission,
agreement with Belgium
4 1924M01 0.4075 1923M11 -0.4091 Hitler Putsch in Munich,
Stresemann government
resigns
5 1923M05 0.3848 1923M03 -0.3700
6 1923M04 0.3676 1921M12 -0.3297
7 1923M10 0.2786 Reichswehr enters Saxony




8 1924M08 0.2655 French troops leave the Ruhr 1931M09 -0.2942 Britain leaves the gold
standard
9 1921M11 0.2087 1922M05 -0.2558
10 1921M09 0.2052 1923M07 -0.2427
Indeed, many salient events that have often been seen as signs of extreme
instability, such as the murder of Erzberger in August 1921, hardly left a trace
at all. Stock prices rose by 7.8% for the month. In June 1923, the month of
Rathenau's assassination, prices fell by 14.4%. Not a small change, to be sure,
but hardly a strong reaction – in the list of largest price declines, the month is
in 18th place.9
Gerald D. Feldman has observed that the relationship between political events
and the inflationary process changed considerably in the early 1920s. By 1922,
events themselves began to have only a minor impact on inflationary
expectations. Instead, they only mattered in so far as they contained additional
information about likely future events that might influence the exchange rate.6
Our brief comparison of the timing of political events on the one hand side, and
of major changes in the German stock price index on the other hand suggests
that negative political news was almost as likely to cause price declines as it
was to cause price increases. It is difficult to see political events as a major
cause of stock market swings if both negative and positive news, for example,
could cause price falls of almost 50 percent in a single month. Some of the most
salient events during the period, such as the London Ultimatum, barely caused
a reaction at all – stock prices increased by 1.6 percent.
If there is no direct, negative impact of political uncertainty on the level of
stock prices, there may still be a relationship between the frequency of political
events such as major disruptions on the one hand side, and the overall
variability of stock prices on the other. The impressionistic comparisons
between political events and stock price movements cannot answer this
question.
Garch Models of Stock Price Volatility
To test if the political uncertainty was crucial for asset price volatility, we need
to define a consistent set of events that, a priori, should be associated with
political instability. The range of possible options is not small. Changes of
government have often been cited as a source of instability, and Weimar
Germany certainly saw a fair number of them. Between 1919 and 1933, the
Reich had no fewer than 21 cabinets. The average Reich Chancellor lasted for
some nine months in office. Elections for parliament were also frequent.
Finally, periods with major putsches, foreign invasion, and assassination
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attempts can be defined as suffering from political uncertainty. We use these
to construct a time series of dummy variables, taking the value of 1 in the case
of political events and zero otherwise if "uncertainty-inducing" political events
took place. Appendix 1 details the periods used.
In addition, we construct an additional index to examine political instability.
We calculate the cumulative number of governments that have been in power
in interwar Germany, divided by the number of years since the inception of the
Republic in 1919. The resulting figure gives the average (annualized) number









An analogous index can be constructed from the measure of political
instability.
Following the work of Engle and Bollerslev, modelling the uncertainty of
economic variables through autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity
models (GARCH) has become increasingly common. The simplest form is,
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The first equation relates the returns on an asset y to a set of explanatory
variables  x; while the second equation fits an a model to the forecast
(conditional) variance of asset returns. where w, a, g and b are parameters, s2
is the variance, and e the error in the returns equation. If a+b<1, the condition
of stationarity is fulfilled. Predictions of future volatility in this model are
based on the long-term average value w, the size of the unpredicted return in
the last period, as well as the conditional volatility in the last period. The11
adjustment parameter  a measures the speed with which the conditional
variance of the inflation forecast changes as a result of an unexpected change
in inflation, and b measures the extent to which a shock to conditional
volatility persists.
In empirical work, GARCH (1,1) models have been preferred in most cases.7
Because the distribution of asset returns has a tendency to violate the
normality assumption, we used the robust covariance matrix procedure by Tim
Bollerslev and Jeff Wooldridge.8 To test for the influence of political events, we
include the dummy variables described at the beginning of this section in the
volatility equation. The coefficient on the additional variable is  l; we
effectively test if l is different from zero and if it has an effect that is large
enough to explain a substantial part of the overall variation of s.
TABLE 3


































Likelihood 176.9 177.6 178.0
Akaike -1.91 -1.92 -1.92
*  indicates significance at the 90% level
** indicates significance at the 95% level
***  indicates significance at the 99% level
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimation method is maximum likelihood with
Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard errors and covariances.
We find a high degree of persistence in shocks, with a+b greater than or close
to unity (though not significantly different from it). This implies that shocks to
the level of variability took a long time to die out. The source of these shocks,
                                                 
7 Bollerslev 1992. To test for the possibility of asymmetric responses, EGARCH and TGARCH
estimation was carried out, but the leverage factor turned out to be insignificant.12
however, is not well identified in the regressions in table 3. Neither changes in
government nor elections were significantly related to increases in volatility,
according to the GARCH models. We find insignificant coefficients for changes
in government as well as for general elections. Even more surprisingly, major
disruptions appear to have a weakly negative association with stock price
volatility. This result should, of course, not be taken to mean that there is a
causal relationship between lower volatility and putsches, insurgencies etc.
Next, we consider the slightly more complex indicators of political uncertainty
presented earlier. The two indicator variables measure the cumulative number
of "events", correcting for changes in the length of the sample.
TABLE  4


























*  indicates significance at the 90% level
** indicates significance at the 95% level
***  indicates significance at the 99% level
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimation method is maximum likelihood with
Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard errors and covariances.
The more aggregate indicators appear to fare similarly poorly in our GARCH
models. The cumulative number of governments, divided by the number of
months since the inception of the Republic, shows a negative coefficient,
whereas the disruptions indicator has a positive sign. Neither of them is
statistically significant, and the coefficients are very small in size. With the
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exception of the persistence of shocks themselves, few factors seem useful in
explaining the variability of stock prices in interwar Germany.
There is, however, one alternative variable that can help us make sense of the
variability of asset returns – inflation. That stock prices respond negatively to
inflation is a well established fact in the finance literature (Campbell and
Ammer 1988, Ammer 1994, Ely and Robinson 1997). There are also good
reasons to think that if uncertainty about future inflation is high, stock
returns will exhibit higher volatility.
Figure 3 plots the natural logarithm of the absolute value of the rate of
inflation alongside the volatility of stock prices. While co-movement is not
perfect, the main cycles are clearly common to both series. In particular, the
spike in the autumn of 1923 can be observed in both series -- both the rate of
inflation and stock market volatility reached extremely high levels.
To test this relationship more closely, I use three further tests. First, I regress
the conditional volatility of stock prices, as derived from the GARCH(1,1)
baseline, on a constant and the conditional volatility of the inflation series.
Second, I use the natural log of the absolute value of inflation as a predictor.
Finally, I use the conditional variance of inflation in the the variance equation







































































The results lend qualified support to the hypothesis that inflation was the
prime culprit behind the extremely high volatility of asset prices during the
period 1919-23. None of the estimation procedures copes without difficulty
with the major swings in our series. While the OLS regressions suffer from
serial correlation, the GARCH model scores well on the log likelihood and the
Akaike criteria. However, the negative coefficient on the Garch component
directly violates the assumptions of the estimation procedure, which rules out
negative conditional variances. Since the estimation procedure needs to find
the optimum of a highly non-linear function, difficulties of this kind can occur
either because of inefficiencies in the software procedure or because the data
actually violate some of the assumptions underlying the use of GARCH.9 The
estimates suggest that, for every percentage point rise in the absolute value of
the inflation rate, the variability of stock prices increased by 7 percent.
                                                 
9 In this case, Eviews was used for estimation purposes. Despite some marked advantages, its
GARCH estimation procedure is known to occasionally encounter difficulties. Future revisions
of this paper will include further results derived from other software packages.15
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*  indicates significance at the 90% level
** indicates significance at the 95% level
***  indicates significance at the 99% level
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimation method is in the GARCH case is maximum
likelihood with Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard errors and covariances.
Despite some statistical shortcomings, inflation appears to offer a better
explanation of stock price volatility than the tumultuous political history of the
period. Of course, it would be too simply to assume that inflation and political
uncertainty did not influence each other. As Webb (1986, 1989) has shown, the
discount on the Mark on the foreign exchanges did widen dramatically in
response to certain political events such as the London Ultimatum, causing an
increase in expected inflation. To the extent that this change in expectations
fed through to higher actual inflation (Webb 1986), it may have had an impact
on the rate of inflation, and thus on stock price variability.
Conclusion
Were political events largely responsible for the high variability of output?
Recent work in finance has suggested as much. Because of the clear link
between the variability of asset prices and the level of industrial production,
political uncertainty has been seen as the villain of the piece. A closer look
reveals that many of the momentuous discontinuities during the early years of
the Weimar Republic failed to leave a trace in asset prices. Also, negative16
events were as likely to coincide with price rises as with price declines. A more
systematic analysis of the link between political events and asset price
volatility failed to find significant effects.
This paper also offers an alternative explanation of the high volatility of asset
prices. Given the well-known link between high inflation and stock market
declines, we examined if uncertainty about the rate of inflation might have
influenced the variability of stock prices. The available statistical evidence
suggests that such a link appears more likely, even if no definitive conclusions
can be drawn from the evidence assembled in this paper. This, however, does
not lead to an outright rejection of the link between political uncertainty and
asset price volatility. The German inflation between 1919 and 1923 was
primarily a political phenomenon, produced by the weakness of the Republic
emerging from the ashes of the lost war. The main purpose of this paper, then,
has been to provide a clearer mapping from political circumstances to
volatility, stressing the importance of the inflationary nexus.17
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16.2.19 19.1.19 6.1.19 15.1.19
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